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The year of Europe 5'w- ~{rJs) 
Prospects for American-European 
relations 
Is 1973 the 'year of Europe'? The question is now being asked on 
both sides of the Atlantic. What can be said with some assurance is 
that the next eighteen months will see the beginnings of a new phase 
in relations between Europe and the United States. The enlargement 
of the European Community has coincided with the break-up of the 
monetary system created immediately after the Second World War, 
and calls for a redefinition of the relationship between Europe and 
America - a redefinition which is bound to include political as well 
as economic issues. 
In these articles reprinted from the June 1973 issue of European 
Community three experts discuss the prospects. Leonard B. Tennyson, 
Director of the Community Information Service in Washington D.C., 
feels that future American administrations will still continue to 
react favourably to the idea of an integrated Europe despite the fact 
that less than half of Americans know what the European Com-
munity is. David Fouquet marks the steps so far taken in getting to 
grips with the problems that divide Washington from Brussels. And 
Pierre Uri, one of the inventors of the European Community, takes 
a somewhat pessimistic look at a situation where psychological 
obstacles may weigh more heavily than the facts. 
Perhaps, as George Ball has recently put it, the difficulties are 
caused rather by a lack, than by an excess, of European unity. 
Relations between the new Europe and the United States will be 
easier when the farmer's unity is demonstrated not only in trade 
but in other areas, too. A Europe assured of its own identity will be 
able to negotiate with enough self-confidence to make concessions 
when they are required and with the consciousness that, in the 
negotiations soon to get under way in the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund 
(!MF), all concerned have everything to gain from success and 
everything to lose from failure. 
Dialogue 
not dispute 
Pierre Uri 
Research Director of the Atlantic Institute, Paris 
According to Mr Nixon and Dr Kissinger, 1973 
is to be 'the year of Europe'. In a sense, this is 
beyond dispute - especially if Eastern Europe is 
included. This year sees five negotiations: the 
new stage of the talks about strategic arms 
(SALT); the beginning of talks on force levels 
(MBFR); the European security conference 
(cscE); the monetary talks; and the prepara-
tion of trade negotiations. But vis-a-vis Western 
Europe alone, the phrase 'the year of Europe' 
sounds both obscure and faintly menacing. 
Can Europe be convinced that the shock 
tactics of Mr Connally, who suddenly suspended 
dollar convertibility and imposed a surtax on 
American imports, have really been abandoned? 
And on the other side, watching Europe make 
its free-trade or preferential arrangements with 
the European neutrals, with Africa, and with the 
Mediterranean countries, can America avoid 
the impression that the Community is hospitable 
to everyone except the United States? Contact, 
at least, is maintained when the President meets 
the member states' national leaders. Would it 
be possible to arrange a meeting between him 
and them, and the Community's executive, all 
together in Europe? Everyone keeps insisting 
that technical obstacles must be overcome by an 
effort of political will. 
The dangers 
On every side there are risks. In default of 
agreement on defence, will Congress not follow 
Senator Mansfield's call for a withdrawal of US 
troops from Europe? In default of successful 
trade negotiations, will it not be led into pro-
tectionism, imposing quotas on 'sensitive' 
imports or banning them altogether? In default 
of a monetary settlement, will Europe not be in 
danger of imposing an import surtax if the 
dollar slips still further? Dr Kissinger tells us 
that the President will not unilaterally reduce 
US forces in Europe: but the precondition is a 
fair sharing of the burdens. And he points out 
that all these subjects - security, trade, monetary 
policy, and even energy policy - are interlinked. 
So what Europe fears is a kind of global 
blackmail, with Europe forced to make trade 
concessions in order to maintain her security. 
Both Edward Heath and Willy Brandt, during 
their visits to Washington, tried to keep these 
subjects in their separate compartments, and 
to ensure that they be treated on their respective 
merits. Yet there is inevitably a link between 
trade and monetary policy. The United States 
seems to feel that countries in balance of pay-
ments surplus should lower their tariffs; Europe 
points out that the depreciation of the dollar has 
in effect nullified American tariff cuts and 
undermined existing European tariffs. The 
trouble is that here the attitudes in question 
are diametrically opposed. The United States 
claims that it cannot accept a new international 
monetary system until its balance of payments 
is righted; Europe argues that monetary 
matters cannot be left to drift, with all the 
danger of crisis th~,t this implies, during a trade 
negotiation that could take several years. 
The difficulty is not one of principle. The 
European summit communique and the joint 
US-European declaration called for trade 
liberalization and expansion. The fact is that 
Europe has in no way suffered from the unpre-
cedented tariff cut~. resulting from the Kennedy 
Round. There is no point in stressing that 
Europe is not making demands: her exports 
and her balance of payments continue to 
improve - as do Japan's, only more so. If 
progress is needed to prevent a sudden wave of 
protectionism in America, such progress would 
benefit Europe. What, then, is the real situation? 
The US balance of payments 
The United States seems to hold other countries 
responsible for its balance of payments pro-
blems - either because of the cost of keeping 
troops in Europe or because of trade barriers. 
But the burden-sharing for which Americans 
call is hard to translate into figures. There has 
been no serious attempt to calculate military 
expenditure on a comparable basis. So Jong as 
the United States was fighting in Vietnam, it 
was a separate item. But it may well be that, in 
order to get them past Congress, the Admini-
stration slips into the defence budget some 
research projects that benefit the economy as a 
whole - whereas Europeans sometimes do 
exactly the reverse, although for similar reasons. 
How can one compare high American pay with 
the token wages paid in France and Italy? And 
if the United States have now reduced their 
military expenditure to 7 per cent of GNP, 
should other countries devote the same per-
centage to it, or should there be a sliding scale 
based on wealth'i' Again, more simply, can 
Europe not lighten the currency burden that 
America assumes? Perhaps; but she could well 
argue that she lends and continues to lend far 
more than America spends, and that her losses 
through the accumulation of dollars are really 
a kind of permanent repayment. 
More direct opposition is aroused by the 
American claim that a trade negotiation would 
ease the US balance of payments. After all, 
it's argued, concessions must balance each other 
out, and in any ordinary negotiation one would 
expect American imports to increase on the 
same scale as American exports. Here, however, 
caution is needed. In the past, 'balance' of this 
sort was based on the volume of previous 
imports: but it would be much more meaningful 
to try to work out the potential increase o 
mutual sales that any given set of tariff cut 
would make possible. Europeans doubt, witl 
some justice, whether a country that make 
$8,000 million a year from its overseas invest 
ments ought really to seek a trade surplus a 
well. Perhaps too much incentive is given t( 
US investment overseas, and not enough t< 
overseas investment in the United States. Fo 
example, the US tax authorities make oversea 
losses deductible, only tax profits if they an 
repatriated, and at the same time tax the incomi 
of overseas investors. Europe has no desire t< 
finance American investments by accumulatin1 
non-convertible dollars, or to facilitate them b· 
limiting her own exports and contributing to ; 
US trade surplus which would threaten employ 
ment in Europe through an American invasior 
of the market. 
Non-tariff barriers 
Nor are matters made easier by the scope of th, 
negotiations themselves. The Kennedy Rounc 
essentially dealt with industrial tariffs, and lef 
agriculture aside. This time, there are nc 
clearly established principles regarding the basi 
of the tariff cuts to be made. Non-tariff barrier: 
- quotas, public tenders, state enterprises 
subsidies, tax concessions, etc. - are growin1 
in importance, especially as tariffs fall. OAT'. 
has recently listed 800 types of non-tarif 
obstacles to trade. It has also been suggestec 
that high tariffs should be cut more than lov 
ones, in order to reduce effective protectior 
rather than nominal duties. Indeed, an industr) 
may be more protected in effect if there is Jes: 
protection on its imports of raw or semi 
finished materials, since the value added will bt 
that much greater than it would be at work 
prices. This means that tariff structure is a: 
important as the non-tariff barriers themselves 
But, here again, the mathematical problems an 
formidable. 
The atmosphere is further worsened by tht 
ambiguous nature of the powers the Presiden 
is seeking from Congress: to raise tariffs as we! 
as to lower them. And America, so long tht 
apostle of non-discrimination, is now seekin1 
the power to retaliate selectively in those case: 
where, in US eyes, other countries are no 
sufficiently open to American exports. One sucl 
clause may be aimed at Japan: but it's no secre 
that Europe may also be threatened if she fail: 
to give satisfaction on agriculture or on reci 
procal preference arrangements with he: 
neighbours and associates. 
These are two areas in which passions rur 
the highest and political considerations carr) 
the most weight. 
Does the CAP fit? 
In reality, agriculture is the field in which the 
United States can most justly claim that restric-
tions imposed by others are partly responsible 
for her deficit. With production costs lower than 
her competitors, as far as large-scale crops are 
concerned, she could well earn several thousand 
million dollars more. True, America too has 
shown protectionist tendencies, in particular as 
regards milk products. And if wealthy cotton 
producers and Texas oil magnates have long 
been regarded as an important political element 
in Washington, it should be easy enough to 
establish that peasants from Correze, the Eiffel, 
or the Italian South are important too. Never-
theless, the negotiation should be a chance 
to ponder. It is not a case of trying to please 
America or to yield to American pressure: 
Europe has other reasons to wonder whether the 
present agricultural policy is the best for her 
least favoured farmers, for her poorer con-
sumers, for success in the battle against inflation. 
In the present situation, it would actually be to 
Europe's advantage if she spent less on support-
ing grain prices and thereby made meat produc-
tion more attractive. But Europe must also look 
to the world. Forecasts have fluctuated lately 
between predictions of famine and hopes of 
abundance: but today, drought is once again 
ravaging large stretches of the Third World. 
Europe's 'special friends' 
On Europe's relations with Africa and the 
Mediterranean countries, the United States 
objects not so much to the preferences that 
Europe grants to them as to those that they 
grant to Europe. Does anyone really believe that 
these 'reverse preferences' are needed to safe-
guard the self-respect of the associates? The fact 
is that reverse preferences reduce the range of 
choice open to purchasers in the associated 
countries, and thereby take back a part of what 
has been offered. Now at last the United States 
***************** 
***************** 
***************** 
is thinking of granting generalized preferences 
to the Third World. Here, Europe pointed the 
way, however restrictedly; and the United 
States are in danger of excluding from the 
system those very products which are most 
important to the poorer countries. But, even 
worse, America plans to exclude from it 
altogether those countries that grant preferences 
to the developed countries. Once again, this 
threat should not be the decisive factor for 
Europe: but Europeans ought to reflect on the 
wisdom of some aspects of their policy. 
;Year of Europe' 
in full swing 
David Fouquet 
The 'year of Europe' is in full swing. 
President Nixon has received and held 
bilateral talks with Italy's Premier Giulio 
Andreotti, Britain's Prime Minister Edward 
Heath, and German Chancellor Willy Brandt, 
and met French President Georges Pompidou 
in Iceland. The US President will be returning 
their visits this autumn. 
Both the Community and the United States 
have started their preparations for the inter-
national trade negotiations that are due to 
begin in September in the GATT. To participate 
in the trade talks, the European Community 
and the United States must obtain negotiating 
mandates according to their respective pro-
cedures. The Commission submitted its outlines 
in April to the Council of Ministers. In a broad 
statement of general goals for the Community 
during the negotiations, the Commission 
focused on tariffs, non-tariff barriers, agriculture, 
developing countries, and safeguard clauses. 
(European Community, May 1973). 
President Nixon's trade reform bill, sent to 
the Congress in April, sought authority: to 
participate in the negotiations; to restrict 
imports as well as reduce trade barriers; aid 
workers and industries harmed by import 
competition; apply generalized tariff preferences 
for under developed countries (similar to those 
already granted by the Community); and 
accord most-favoured nation status to Commu-
nist countries. 
Last month the Community Council of 
Ministers and the US House of Representatives 
began to study the respective trade proposals 
before them. 
Other negotiations 
The 'year of Europe' will also be marked by 
other sets of international talks that will 
affect the Atlantic relationship. 
* On the monetary front, 20 nations are trying 
to draft at least preliminary proposals to reform 
the world monetary system by the time the 
International Monetary Fund holds its annual 
meeting in Nairobi in September. 
* On the military front, the United States and 
the Soviet Union have begun discussions in 
Do as you would be done by 
This is not the time for slogans. Dr Kissinger 
hit the headlines with his proposal for a 'new 
Atlantic Charter'; but Willy Brandt observed 
with some irony that if it took three days to 
write the communique about a political meeting, 
it would take more than three months to draw 
up such a Charter. Nor is it necessary. The 
North Atlantic Treaty is very flexible; and a 
new Atlantic Charter would, among other things, 
make an apparent contrast with the Ostpolitik 
that both America and Europe are pursuing. 
Nor should we be up in arms because Dr 
Kissinger has accused Europe of concentrating 
on regional interests. In fact, he reminded 
Europeans that the United States would like 
Europe to recognize her world responsibilities. 
If Europe were to equip herself to have a foreign 
policy, this would be a far better response than 
pained or angry rhetoric. 
The time has come for Europe calmly to 
recover the inspiration that prompted her first 
efforts at unity. At that time, no country was 
asked to renounce anything essential: all they 
were asked to recognize was that they must do 
as they would be done by. We now have a new 
opportunity to apply the same logic. Rather than 
retorts or threats, it is this that should guide and 
arm the Community in its future negotiations 
with the world's greatest powers. 
Vienna on the second phase of their strategic 
arms limitation talks (SALT). These may directly 
involve tactical nuclear weapons stationed by 
the United States in Europe or generally affect 
the US resolve or ability to continue to shield 
Europe with its nuclear arsenal. 
* Also, 12 nations from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and seven from the War-
saw Pact have opened talks in Vienna on mutual 
and balanced force reductions in central Europe. 
* On a broader scale, 34 Atlantic and Euro-
pean states are preparing in Helsinki a con-
ference that could open in July on European 
security and cooperation and could affect trade, 
political stability and East-West cultural scien-
tific contacts. 
Call for new 'Atlantic Charter' 
The American send-off for the year of Europe 
was given on April 23 when US Presidential 
adviser Henry Kissinger, in a rare public address, 
proclaimed the need for a 'new Atlantic 
Charter' before the end of the year. The pro-
posal was intended to be a significant initiative -
some compared it with the address 26 years 
earlier by Secretary of State George C. Marshall 
that launched the Marshall Plan to reconstruct 
war-torn Europe. 
Following the mixed initial reception to the 
Kissinger speech, it is unclear whether his call 
will result in a concrete set of guidelines for 
a new relationship between nations, a set of 
platitudes, or no document at all. Speaking for 
the President, Dr Kissinger proposed that 'by 
the time the President travels to Europe toward 
the end of the year, we will have worked out a 
new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the 
future.' He added that to be viable, 'Atlantic' 
solutions must include Japan. 
Dr Kissinger observed that 'In the forties and 
fifties the task was economic reconstruction and 
security against the danger of attack. The West 
responded with courage and imagination. Today 
the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as 
dynamic a force in building a new structure of 
peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious 
of opportunities, drawing its aspirations from 
its goals rather than its fears.' 
He said President Nixon would deal with 
Atlantic problems comprehensively. 'The politi-
cal, military and economic issues in Atlantic 
relations', he continued, 'are linked by reality 
not by choice nor for the tactical purpose of 
trading one off against the others.' 
In the course of his address, Dr Kissinger 
touched on the major elements of Atlantic 
relations. In the military sector, he said, 
America remained committed to 'doing its 
fair share,' and was 'adamantly opposed to 
unilateral withdrawals of US forces from 
Europe.' Nevertheless, he added, 'we owe to our 
peoples a rational defence posture, at the safest 
minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably 
shared.' He reassured Europe that troop-
reduction talks between NATO and Warsaw 
Pact nations were not a subterfuge for US troop 
withdrawals regardless of the consequences. 
Although the United States would continue 
to support the unification of Europe, he noted 
that 'Europe's economic success and its trans-
formation from a recipient of our aid to a strong 
competitor has produced a certain amount of 
friction.' He added that the forthcoming world 
trade negotiations in the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and monetary reform 
talks were a historic opportunity. But, he 
warned, they must have the guidance from top 
political leaders lest they become dominated 
by competing economic interests and pressure 
groups. America regarded 'these negotiations 
not as a test of strength, but as a test of joint 
statesmanship,' he said. 
Detente with Communist states 
He also foresaw that the United States would 
continue its efforts at detente with Communist 
states, but assured the US's allies that 'we have 
no intentions of buying an illusionary tran-
quillity at the expense of our friends.' 
US officials later told the press that Mr Nixon 
visualized the signature during his visit to 
Europe of a document of principles between 
the United States and Europe, similar to the 
statement signed between the United States and 
the Soviet Union on the occasion of Mr Nixon's 
1972 visit to Moscow. That declaration was a 
broad statement of principles to guide US-
Soviet economic, political, security, scientific 
and cultural relations. 
European reactions 
Official response by European governments to 
date has been sparse. And much press reaction 
has been reserved or sceptical. However, some 
of Dr Kissinger's proposals were not far from 
those made a short while before by Commission 
President Franc;ois-Xavier Ortoli, British Prime 
Minister Edward Heath and Commission 
Vice-President Sir Christopher Soames. 
In a speech to the European Parliament on 
February 13, President Ortoli stated that US-
Community 'difficulties, however natural, will 
be less important than the mutual advantages 
to be gained from the whole body of our 
relations with each other.' He also agreed that 
these forthcoming trade negotiations would be 
complex but would be a 'test of truth for the 
participants.' 
During a visit to Washington Mr Heath on 
February 1 agreed to the linking of certain 
disparate elements of Atlantic relations when 
he observed that 'it is not possible to think 
of these (economic and monetary) issues 
entirely in isolation.' He cautioned, however, 
that 'we must ensure that progress in one does 
not need to wait on detailed decisions in 
another.' On the question of military burden-
sharing, raised again by Dr Kissinger, Mr Heath 
commented: 'We certainly recognize that as the 
relative economic strength of Europe increases, 
so too should the share of the common defence 
burden which Europe bears. Already we have 
shown that we intend to improve our defence 
effort.' 
The inclusion of Japan in the European-
American dialogUt! was also foreseen in a 
speech by Commission Vice-President Sir 
Christopher Soam!s on April 5. 'It may be 
healthy,' he noted 'that the bilateral European-
American relationship should be reinforced by 
a subtler triangular one in which Japan is 
brought on the sam~ basis into our consultations 
on trade, on money, on the crucial and pressing 
issues of the world's future supplies of energy, 
on research, on international investment, on 
development aid a.nd on whatever else is of 
their concern as much as ours.' 
Although many of the points in Dr Kissinger's 
speech were not radical trial balloons, the idea 
of imposing a deadline at this moment to 
codify policy guiddines was not greeted with 
enthusiasm. 
Perhaps the warmest comment came early 
from NATO Secretary Joseph Luns, who termed 
the Kissinger address 'a far-reaching concept' 
requiring careful study. He forecast that Europe 
'will respond positively to this worldwide 
initiative and it will prove an important element 
in revitalizing and updating the transatlantic 
relationship.' 
France noted its 'interest' in the proposal 
and said it deserved 'attentive study'. A French 
spokesman said the French examination would 
be undertaken 'in the spirit which has always 
been ours, that of faithfulness to the alliance in 
the context of respect for our independence.' 
On May 10, French Foreign Minister Michel 
Jobert joined others who did not want the 
various negotiations due this year to be strictly 
linked. 
Mr Heath last month said the emergence of 
Western Europe made necessary a new defini-
tion of relations between the Nine, Japan and 
the US. Britain would respond positively to the 
Kissinger call, he said. 
British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-
Home also promised a positive British con-
tribution to the Community's reaction, but 
added 'In an ideal world we would have chosen 
a different time scale. We would have preferred 
that the new Community of Nine had time to 
shake down and find its way to common posi-
tions with greater deliberation. The pressure of 
events on both sides of the Atlantic and in 
Japan obliges us all to quicken the pace.' 
Sir Alec observed that 'an economically strong 
and unified Western Europe may create some 
awkward cases of competition for the United 
States, but a weak and divided Western Europe 
would be a dangerous source of instability.' 
A strong reaction came from Germany. 
Herbert Wehner, deputy chairman of Chancellor 
Willy Brandt's Social Democrat Party, was 
quoted as saying that the Kissinger proposals 
seemed like 'an outline for a monster'. During 
Chancellor Brandt's official visit to Washington 
on May 1-2, he dashed cold water on the 'new 
Atlantic charter' suggestion by calling at least 
for a delay in its consideration. 
Soames's seven principles 
Without labelling it as such, Commission Vice-
President Sir Christopher Soames on May 8 
provided what could be a blueprint for the pro-
posed charter, if it is ever written. In a speech tc 
a European Parliament session attended by a 
delegation from the US House of representa-
tives, he drew a line between the Kissinger plea 
for overall political control of all the negotia-
tions and direct links between the talks. He alsc 
rebuffed a charge in the Kissinger speech thal 
the Community had a 'regional' outlook. 
Although he professed reservations abou1 
documents and institutionalized dialogues, Si, 
Christopher outlined seven 'cardinal objectivei 
we share' that could form the nucleus of a ne\\ 
Atlantic charter: 
* A commitment 'to uphold our commor 
democratic political traditions'; 
* Making the world safe 'against injustice 
violence and aggression; 
* Seeking peace and cooperation with "thos( 
whose collective aspirations differ from ou, 
own'; 
* Acknowledging 'our joint responsibilitie• 
towards the poorest parts of the world'; 
* Further liberalizing world trade; 
* Seeking to build 'a sounder monetary order" 
* Joint action to protect the environment anc 
energy reserves. 
Press comment 
Newspapers were generally cool in thei, 
comments. Some, on both sides of the Atlantic 
raised doubts that in the wake of the Watergatt 
affair Mr Nixon could defend his recent!) 
presented trade bill in Congress or his vow no1 
to cut US troops in Europe. The Guardim 
noted that it might be extravagant to compare 
the Kissinger proposals with the Marshall plan. 
but added 'the answer to Dr Kissinger's main 
question, does Europe want to join America 
and Japan in seeking common objectives, 1s a 
clear and resounding, "yes".' 
Monnet group's call for 
two experts 
Another major reaction came out of a n,eetin~ 
in Brussels on May 3-4 of the Action Committee 
for the United States of Europe, headed b) 
Jean Monnet, the founding architect of the 
Community. The Action Committee urged the 
Community to 'respond actively' to the 
Kissinger proposals and suggested the appoint· 
ment of two independent personalities by tht 
Community and the United States to make ar 
inventory of the commercial and monetar) 
difficulties between the two sides of the Atlantic 
The group also passed a resolution statin~ 
that the most urgent tasks facing the Nine wen 
to make progress towards economic anc 
monetary union and to ensure that the dis-
cussions between the Community and th1 
United States took place on a basis of equality 
Interest in Atlantic relations has not been sc 
acute for many years. What it will lead to ii 
far from clear. Some sceptics recall a previow 
American appeal for a new Atlantic relationshi~ 
that went partly unanswered. In 1962 Presiden 
John F. Kennedy suggested a 'declaration o 
interdependence' between Europe and th1 
United States and a new 'Atlantic partnership' 
But even if the formal signing of a 'charter 
does not take place, perhaps during Mr Nixon'i 
visit, both sides clearly want to end the bickerin! 
over trade and troops. 
Soames:EC 
policies not 
1regional' 
Commission Vice-President Sir Christopher 
Soames, in charge of external relations, answers 
questions put to him by EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. 
President Nixon's 1973 Foreign Policy Report 
to Congress suggests that the Community pur-
sues increasingly 'regional economic policies 
while seeking to preserre American protection in 
defence and an undiminished political commit-
mellf to European unification.' 
ls Europe trying to have its cake and eat it? 
Certainly our political commitment to European 
unification is undiminished, and I am glad to see 
that the United States commitment to that same 
political objective has just been reiterated by the 
President himself. 
Certainly we shall continue to see our defence 
and that of the United States as part of a 
cooperative endeavour with the United States 
in which each benefits from the efforts of the 
rest, and each must play his honourable part, 
sharing risks, costs and burdens. 
But the Community is not increasingly 
pursuing regionalism. It is increasingly pursuing 
global objectives. Without its existence, the 
Kennedy Round could not have been engaged 
and could not have succeeded. 
The Community was the first to institute a 
generalized preference scheme for the benefit 
of developing countries. 
And our member states yield to none in the 
proportion of their national product that flows 
to the Third World for its development. 
As we grow in strength and unity, so will our 
worldwide responsibilities. We intend to do 
our utmost to live up to them. 
In his 'Atlantic Charter' speech on April 23 
Dr Henry Kissinger said President Nixon would 
seek 'to deal with Atlantic problems compre-
hensively'. He added: 'The political, military and 
economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked 
by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical 
purpose of trading off one against the other'. 
Isn't the Community handicapped because it 
cannot speak with one voice on all three aspects? 
Yes, certainly the Community is handicapped 
because it speaks with one voice so far really 
only on trade. 
But our member states have recognized this 
and pledged themselves to achieve a European 
Union by 1980. That is an urgently necessary 
objective. It will allow us to act as a unit in 
monetary matters, on energy questions, and, I 
trust, more and more also in foreign policy. 
We in the Commission have long argued that 
the coming trade negotiations can succeed only 
if we bear in mind that they form part of this 
great complex relationship in which many 
other wider political considerations are equally 
involved, and that these negotiations, technical 
though they may be, are of prime political 
control. 
On the other hand, it would be mistaken to 
argue, because these problems are interrelated, 
that they should therefore all be lumped into 
one big basket and dealt with together in a single 
negotiation; that all issues, regardless of their 
intrinsic time-scales, have to be tied up by 
a single deadline; that every solution for any 
one must be conditional on solutions for them 
all; and that the difficulties in any one should 
block progress in the others. 
Certainly all these problems call for overall 
political direction and management. But to 
force into a single forum all the diverse questions 
we confront, far from simplifying their solution, 
could complicate and exacerbate them. 
President Nixon's visit to Europe in the 
autumn will provide a most welcome opportu-
nity for meetings at the highest level, where our 
interrelated problems can be treated in political 
perspective and our ways of approaching them 
coordinated. That is the sort of overarching 
political control which is so essential in the 
face of the many and abrupt changes which have 
played on our relationship. 
Would you agree with a comment in the NEW 
YORK TIMES that the next round of world trade 
negotiations will differ from the Kennedy Round 
because the emphasis will be on 'safeguards' that 
amount to temporary restraints 011 free trade, 
rather than 011 the expansion of world trade 
through more liberalization? 
Safeguards will figure, of course, as they must 
do if we want to liberalize trade in general: 
but we are proposing that any more flexible 
safeguards procedures should be placed under 
close international supervision and must be 
operated according to strictly defined criteria. 
In our approach to the trade negotiations we 
lay the chief emphasis on positive measures: 
on reciprocal trade liberalization, on the 
reduction of tariffs, on the elimination of non-
tariff barriers to trade, on increasing trade in 
agricultural products, and above all on ensuring 
that the developing nations of the world reap 
a major benefit from whatever the developed 
countries in these negotiations agree to do 
amongst themselves. 
The US looks to Europe-still 
I 
Leonard B. Tennyson 
Mr Tennyson is Director of the 
European Community Information Service 
in Washington, DC 
From 1945 to 1973, time and events have 
altered and loosened the ties that bind the 
Atlantic nations. The 'postwar era' is gone. It 
expired some time in the sixties. Historians have 
still to pinpoint the circumstances and time of 
its death. There are those who are distressed by 
its departure. It was founded upon comfortable 
assurances. Two superpowers simplified the 
task of global stability by their bipolar inter-
action and their patron-client relations with 
allies and neighbours. It appeared to be a world 
of linear political equations and uncomplicated 
economic truths. 
Today, a convenient label has not yet been 
found to describe the ambiguous, complex, 
and changing multipower world of the 1970s. 
New conceptual frameworks are being sought 
by nations to contain policies for the new era. 
Among these is the search by the United 
States for a proper place for old allies and a new 
power - Western Europe - in the shaping of a 
new global policy. 
Eurocentrism 
The plight of the ravaged nations of Western 
Europe, allies and foes alike, found ready and 
sympathetic response from Americans at the 
war's end. When private and international 
relief efforts could not match the need, Secretary 
of State George C. Marshall's proposal in June 
of 1947 marked the US government's recog-
nition of the inseparable fate that linked Europe 
and the United States. 
The generation of men who helped shape US 
foreign policy after 1945 were distinguished 
by two particular characteristics. First, they 
were well armed with plans and ideas, formu-
lated during the dark war-time years, for 
restructuring a world wherein obsessive natio-
nalism and the threat of war could be lessened. 
Second, the 'world' they saw lay to the east, 
across the Atlantic. It was Europe. 
Early expectations were that a revived 
Europe would of necessity be made up of 
states 'acting in concert'. Official papers, often 
seeming to reflect the views of Jean Monnet, 
and the pronouncements by Marshall Plan 
leaders, stressed the need for a European 
customs union or an economically united 
Europe. Congressional leaders went further, with 
some espousing a 'European federation' as a 
suitable guarantee that Marshall Plan aid would 
be politically as well as economically effective. 
Well-wishers for Europe's future were also 
among the editorial writers, journalists, business-
men, and trade union leaders of the day. 
Consequently, when M. Monnet and Robert 
Schuman proposed the Coal and Steel Com-
munity in 1950, it seemed an expected fruit, 
albeit modest, born of US aid and hopes. 
Thus, in the late forties and early fifties, a 
vital cornerstone of US foreign policy was laid: 
support for the integration of Western Europe. 
Successive administrations of both American 
political parties endorsed this policy, which 
became the most durable and consistent of the 
many stances the United States adopted vis-a-
vis the rest of the world for the next two decades. 
Appraisal, options, and partners 
American hopes for speedy economic and 
political integration in Europe soared in the 
early fifties when the European Defence Com-
munity (rnc) was proposed by France and 
quickly embraced by the United States. Here at 
least was a political solution to the vexing 
problem of Germany. Yet, when these hopes 
were dashed in August 1954 by the French 
National Assembly, John Foster Dulles' earlier 
warning of an 'agonizing reappraisal' of US 
policy toward Europe failed to materialize. 
Not even the 1956 Suez crisis and the accom-
panying Anglo-French misadventure in the 
Middle East swerved US European policy from 
its course. Europe's economic well-being, and 
with it political stability, were already visibly 
restored. 
When the European Economic Community 
became a political possibility a year after Suez, 
the United States stood at the fore-front of its 
supporters. British leaders warned privately 
against the continental monster being fostered 
by US policy, but the Eisenhower administra-
tion turned a deaf ear. The Americans merely 
regretted that Britain had chosen not to join the 
'Six' in their bold new endeavour. They ven-
tured the opinion that the British option of a 
free trade association would be a dead-end 'Our baby is getting dangerously big 
street. 
When John F. Kennedy came into office in 
1961, his was generally regarded as the first 
post\\ ar administration not oriented toward 
European affairs. The Cuban missile crisis and 
Kcnncdy's confrontation with Nikita S. 
Khruschcv in Vienna quickly overcame that 
mispcrccption. The Administration immediately 
moved to strengthen its ties with Europe and 
reaffirm its faith in an integrated Europe. 
'Atlantic partnership' became a popular catch-
word, and his 'declaration of interdependence' 
became a new 'grand design'. The Trade 
Expansion Act, leading to the Kennedy Round 
negotiations within the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), became a more 
palpable manifestation of American regard for 
an emerging European entity in the form of the 
European Community. 
French President Charles de Gaulle's veto 
of the United Kingdom's membership of the 
Community in 1963 doused American optimism 
for Europe with icy water. Yet, it was France 
under de Gaulle toward which US policy 
showed reserve and the polite restraint rather 
than to the European Community. France's 
cold-shoulder to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization confirmed the trend. The post-
war Atlantic world had indeed changed. The 
old client-patron relationship was shifting. 
Things would never quite be the same again. 
The curtain may have fallen on the postwar 
era in May 1967 when the United States and the 
European Community emerged from their 
three-year GATT negotiation. By reducing global 
tariffs to their lowest level in history, the United 
States and the Community gave the first proof 
of their 'partnership' for the first time. The 
'Europe of the Six' had successfully confronted 
a superpower in a show of equality. 
Beyond the postwar era 
The cheers and self-congratulations had scarcely 
subsided after the Kennedy Round when 
American disaffection with Europe began to 
surface. The portents had been present long 
before. In process since 1964 were a sharply 
down-turning US balance-of-payments, a reduc-
tion of the US trade surplus, and an inward-
turning of the national consciousness partly 
encouraged by growing involvement in South-
east Asia. Also, US industry had been investing 
heavily in wholly owned subsidiaries throughout 
the world, particularly in the booming Common 
Market. 
By 1968, prote,;tionism, which had been 
hidden in the closet for more than a decade, 
came out into the open. The trade unions, long 
the bastions of liberal trade, turned protectio-
nist, blaming US multinational firms for 
exporting jobs. Congress regarded as almost 
whimsical the notion that it should honour the 
Johnson administration's pledge in the Kennedy 
Round to abolish the American selling price 
system of customs valuation, and from 1968 to 
1972, some 200 bills were introduced annually 
in Congress to restrict trade. 
The turn-around came swiftly from libera-
lism to protectiornsm and from optimism to 
guarded suspicion. One scapegoat of these new 
attitudes and reactions was the European 
Community. It was linked with Japan, multi-
national companies, and international specu-
lators, as a contributor to United States' 
economic and monetary woes. By 1970, 
spokesmen in the Nixon administration were 
upbraiding the Community for its 'highly 
protectionist' policies and threatening that the 
'United States' is no longer willing to pay an 
economic price for non-existent political unity.' 
These frustrated expressions, which also came 
from the Congress and certain sectors of 
industry, flew in the face of fact. Even US trade 
statistics disproved the complaints. With the 
Community the US had had a consistent trade 
surplus, the Community's industrial tariff levels 
were lower and more even than those of the 
United States, its quantitative restrictions were 
fewer, and its non-tariff barriers were no more 
protective. 
Why, then, the disparity between claims and 
facts? One answer may have been that the US 
administration, preoccupied with balancing US 
interests elsewhere in the world, neglected Europe 
and allowed the dialogue to fall to the level of a 
greengrocer's quarrel. For a while, the adminis-
tration seemed to have forgotten that trade and 
related matters involve foreign policy. 
'The year of Europe' 
This year, on April 23, Henry A. Kissinger 
sought to redress the balance and to assure 
Europe that 1973 is still 'the year of Europe' 
as far as the US administration's foreign policy 
is concerned. He acknowledged that both sides 
have benefited from European integration and 
pledged continuing US support for the unifi-
cation of Europe. Alluding to the low level of 
recent debate, he underscored the importance 
of ensuring the success of forthcoming monetary 
and trade negotiations by engaging the 'top 
political leaders' who could commit a political 
will to the undertaking. 
What will happen to United States· policy 
toward Europe remains to be seen. Kissinger', 
address held out hope of a change in the 
climate of relations and a reawakening of the 
'partnership' but his reference to the Commu-
nity as having solely regional interests ris-,1-ri; 
US global interests was neither true nor 
generous. The New York Times commenti112 
editorially on the address, said: 'Mr Kissinger'; 
text includes along with its spirit of uplift, al 
the administration's stock complaints aboul 
Europe - the dubious as well as the justified.' 
Odds arc favourable that this and succeedim 
administrations will continue to lend suppor~ 
to the concept of an integrated Europe. But th, 
period of the United States as the doting anc 
protective parent to a growing European chilc 
is finished. The years ahead will be marked b) 
continuing differences as the United State! 
adjusts to the reality of being parent to a ncarlv-
mature offspring and as the European Comm~· 
nity seeks further to establish its identity. 
After more than 20 years of the mard 
toward integration of Europe, a recent pol 
shows that only about 48 per cent of American! 
know of the European Community's existence 
This decade could mark the period when th, 
American people, always generously disposec 
toward the idea of a United Europe, wil 
awaken to the reality of the Community as c 
partner and as a powerful factor for peace anc 
stability in the world. 
The European Community and the 
United States in figures 
Area (LOOOs of square miles) 
Population ( 1971) 
G.N.P. 
Imports 
Exports 
Average Grain Production 1970 
( 1.000s of tons) 
Meat Production ( 1.000s of tons) 
Milk Production ( 1.000s of tons) 
Steel Production ( 1.000s of tons) 
Car Production ( LOOOs) 
Electrical energy in use per head 
(Kilowatt hours) 
Cars in use (millions) 
Cars per 1.000 population 
TV sets (millions) 
TV sets per I .OOO population 
Telephones in use (millions) 
Telephones per I ,OOO population 
European Community 
591 
253,142,000 
$694.1 billion 
$68,012.7 million 
$68.032.7 million 
$93,558 (1970) 
18,344 
936.37 ( 1970) 
138.996 (1972 
I 0,246.8 ( 1972) 
3.115 (1971) 
58.6675 (1971) 
232 
57.5 
227 
50.2(1971) 
198 
United States 
3,600 
207.500.000 
$1,068.8 billion 
$55,555.2 million 
$49.675.7 million 
$204. 604 ( 1970) 
23.227 
527.07 (1969) 
I I 1.780 ( 1971 ) 
8.584 ( 1971) 
7.579 (1971) 
92.7530(1971) 
447 
81 
399 
115.2 (1971) 
567 

